The Theory of Moral Sentiments

f those systems which make virtue consist in benevolence.

The system which makes virtue consist in benevolence,

though I think not so ancient as all of those

which I have already given an account of, is, however,

of very great antiquity. It seems to have been

the doctrine of the greater part of those philosophers

who, about and after the age of Augustus, called

themselves Eclectics, who pretended to follow chiefly

the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras, and who upon

that account are commonly known by the name of

the later Platonists.

In the divine nature, according to these authors,

benevolence or love was the sole principle of action,

and directed the exertion of all the other attributes.

The wisdom of the Deity was employed in finding

out the means for bringing about those ends which

his goodness suggested, as his infinite power was exerted

to execute them. Benevolence, however, was

still the supreme and governing attribute, to which

the others were subservient, and from which the whole

excellency, or the whole morality, if I may be allowed

such an expression, of the divine operations,

was ultimately derived. The whole perfection and

virtue of the human mind consisted in some resemblance

or participation of the divine perfections, and,

consequently, in being filled with the same principle

322of benevolence and love which influenced all the actions

of the deity. The actions of men which flowed

from this motive were alone truly praise-worthy, or

could claim any merit in the sight of the deity. It

was by actions of charity and love only that we

could imitate, as became us, the conduct of God,

that we could express our humble and devout admiration

of his infinite perfections, that by fostering in

our own minds the same divine principle, we could

bring our own affections to a greater resemblance

with his holy attributes, and thereby become more

proper objects of his love and esteem; till at last we

arrived at that immediate converse and communication

with the deity to which it was the great object of

this philosophy to raise us.

This system, as it was much esteemed by many

ancient fathers of the christian church, so after the

reformation it was adopted by several divines of the

most eminent piety and learning, and of the most

amiable manners; particularly, by Dr. Ralph Cudworth,

by Dr. Henry More, and by Mr. John Smith

of Cambridge. But of all the patrons of this system,

ancient or modern, the late Dr. Hutcheson, was undoubtedly

beyond all comparison, the most acute,

the most distinct, the most philosophical, and what

is of the greatest consequence of all, the soberest and

most judicious.

That virtue consists in benevolence is a notion

supported by many appearances in human nature.

It has been observed already that proper benevolence

is the most graceful and agreeable of all the

affections, that it is recommended to us by a double

sympathy, that as its tendency is necessarily beneficent,

323it is the proper object of gratitude and reward,

and that upon all these accounts it appears to our

natural sentiments to possess a merit superior to any

other. It has been observed too that even the weakness

of benevolence are not very disagreeable to us,

whereas those of every other passion are always extremely

disgusting. Who does not abhor excessive

malice, excessive selfishness, or excessive resentment?

But the most excessive indulgence even of partial

friendship is not so offensive. It is the benevolent

passions only which can exert themselves without

any regard or attention to propriety, and yet retain

something about them which is engaging. There is

something pleasing even in mere instinctive good-will

which goes on to do good offices without once

reflecting whether by this conduct it is the proper

object either of blame or approbation. It is not so

with the other passions. The moment they are deserted,

the moment they are unaccompanied by the

sense of propriety, they cease to be agreeable.

As benevolence bestows upon those actions which

proceed from it, a beauty superior to all others, so

the want of it, and much more the contrary inclination,

communicates a peculiar deformity to whatever

evidences such a disposition. Pernicious actions are

often punishable for no other reason than because they

show a want of sufficient attention to the happiness

of our neighbour.

Besides all this, Dr. Hutcheson[18] observed, that

whenever in any action, supposed to proceed from

benevolent affections, some other motive had been

324discovered, our sense of the merit of this action was

just so far diminished as this motive was believed to

have influenced it. If an action, supposed to proceed,

from gratitude, should be discovered to have arisen from

an expectation of some new favour, or if what was

apprehended to proceed from public spirit, should be

found out to have taken its origin from the hope of

a pecuniary reward, such a discovery would entirely

destroy all notion of merit or praise-worthiness in

either of these actions. Since, therefore, the mixture

of any selfish motive, like that of a base alloy, diminished

or took away altogether the merit which

would otherwise have belonged to any action, it was

evident, he imagined, that virtue must consist in pure

and disinterested benevolence alone.

18. See Inquiry concerning virtue, sect. 1. and 2.

When those actions, on the contrary, which are

commonly supposed to proceed from a selfish motive,

are discovered to have arisen from a benevolent one,

it greatly enhances our sense of their merit. If we

believed of any person that he endeavoured to advance

his fortune from no other view but that of doing

friendly offices, and of making proper returns to

his benefactors, we should only love and esteem him

the more. And this observation seemed still more to

confirm the conclusion, that it was benevolence only

which could stamp upon any action the character of

virtue.

Last of all, what, he imagined, was an evident

proof of the justness of this account of virtue, in all

the disputes of casuists concerning the rectitude of

conduct, the public good, he observed, was the

standard to which they constantly referred; thereby

universally acknowledging that whatever tended to

325promote the happiness of mankind was right and

laudable and virtuous, and the contrary, wrong,

blameable, and vicious. In the late debates about

passive obedience and the right of resistance, the sole

point in controversy among men of sense was, whether

universal submission would probably be attended

with greater evils than temporary insurrections when

privileges were invaded. Whether what, upon the

whole, tended most to the happiness of mankind,

was not also morally good, was never once, he said,

made a question.

Since benevolence, therefore, was the only motive

which could bestow upon any action the character

of virtue, the greater the benevolence which was

evidenced by any action, the greater the praise which

must belong to it.

Those actions which aimed at the happiness of a

great community, as they demonstrated a more enlarged

benevolence than those which aimed only at

that of a smaller system, so were they, likewise, proportionally

the more virtuous. The most virtuous

of all affections, therefore, was that which embraced

as its object the happiness of all intelligent beings.

The lead virtuous, on the contrary, of those to which

the character of virtue could in any respect belong,

was that which aimed no further than at the happiness

of an individual, such as a son, a brother, a

friend.

In directing all our actions to promote the greatest

possible good, in submitting all inferior affections to

the desire of the general happiness of mankind, in

regarding ones self but as one of the many, whose

326prosperity was to be pursued no further than it was

consistent with, or conducive to that of the whole,

consisted the perfection of virtue.

Self-love was a principle which could never be

virtuous in any degree or in any direction. It was

vicious whenever it obstructed the general good.

When it had no other effect than to make the individual

take care of his own happiness, it was merely

innocent, and tho’ it deserved no praise, neither

ought it to incur any blame. Those benevolent

actions which were performed, notwithstanding some

strong motive from self-interest, were the more virtuous

upon that account. They demonstrated the

strength and vigour of the benevolent principle.

Dr. Hutcheson[19] was so far from allowing self-love

to be in any case a motive of virtuous actions,

that even a regard to the pleasure of self-approbation,

to the comfortable applause of our own consciences,

according to him, diminished the merit of a benevolent

action. This was a selfish motive, he thought,

which, so far as it contributed to any action, demonstrated

the weakness of that pure and disinterested

benevolence which could alone stamp upon the conduct

of man the character of virtue. In the common

judgments of mankind, however, this regard

to the approbation of our own minds is so far from

being considered as what can in any respect diminish

the virtue of any action, that it is rather looked upon

as the sole motive which deserves the appellation of

virtuous.

19. Inquiry concerning virtue, sect 2. art. 4. also illustrations

on the moral sense, sect. 5. last paragraph.

327Such is the account given of the nature of virtue

in this amiable system, a system which has a peculiar

tendency to nourish and support in the human heart

the noblest and the most agreeable of all affections,

and not only to check the injustice of self-love, but

in some measure to discourage that principle altogether,

by representing it as what could never reflect

any honour upon those who were influenced by it.

As some of the other systems which I have already

given an account of, do not sufficiently explain from

whence arises the peculiar excellency of the supreme

virtue of beneficence, so this system seems to have

the contrary defect, of not sufficiently explaining

from whence arises our approbation of the inferior

virtues of prudence, vigilance, circumspection, temperance,

constancy, firmness. The view and aim of

our affections, the beneficent and hurtful effects which

they tend to produce, are the only qualities at all attended

to in this system. Their propriety and impropriety,

their suitableness and unsuitableness, to

the cause which excites them, are disregarded altogether.

Regard to our own private happiness and interest

too, appear upon many occasions very laudable principles

of action. The habits of œconomy, industry,

discretion, attention, and application of thought,

are generally supposed to be cultivated from self-interested

motives, and at the same time are apprehended

to be very praise-worthy qualities, which deserve

the esteem and approbation of every body.

The mixture of a selfish motive, it is true, seems

often to sully the beauty of those actions which ought

328to arise from a benevolent affection. The cause of

this, however, is not that self-love can never be

the motive of a virtuous action, but that the benevolent

principle appears in this particular case to

want its due degree of strength, and to be altogether

unsuitable to its object. The character, therefore,

seems evidently imperfect, and upon the whole

to deserve blame rather than praise. The mixture

of a benevolent motive in an action to which self-love

alone ought to be sufficient to prompt us, is

not so apt indeed to diminish our sense of its propriety,

or of the virtue of the person who performs it.

We are not ready to suspect any person of being defective

in selfishness. This is by no means the weak

side of human nature, or the failing of which we

are apt to be suspicious. If we could really believe,

however, of any man, that, was it not from a regard

to his family and friends, he would not take that

proper care of his health, his life, or his fortune, to

which self-preservation alone ought to be sufficient to

prompt him, it would undoubtedly be a failing, tho’

one of those amiable failings, which render a person

rather the object of pity than of contempt or hatred.

It would still, however, somewhat diminish the dignity

and respectableness of his character. Carelessness

and want of œconomy are universally disapproved

of, not, however as proceeding from a want

of benevolence, but from a want of the proper attention

to the objects of self-interest.

Though the standard by which casuists frequently

determine what is right or wrong in human

conduct, be its tendency to the welfare or disorder

of society, it does not follow that a regard to the

329welfare of society should be the sole virtuous motive

of action, but only that, in any competition, it

ought to cast the balance against all other motives.

Benevolence may, perhaps, be the sole principle

of action in the Deity, and there are several, not improbable,

arguments which tend to persuade us that

it is so. It is not easy to conceive what other motive

an independent and all perfect being, who stands in

need of nothing external, and whose happiness is

complete in himself, can act from. But whatever

may be the case with the Deity, so imperfect a creature

as man, the support of whose existence requires

so many things external to him, must often act from

many other motives. The condition of human nature

were peculiarly hard, if those affections, which,

by the very nature of our being, ought frequently to

influence our conduct, could upon no occasion appear

virtuous, or deserve esteem and commendation from

any body.

Those three systems, that which places virtue in

propriety, that which places it in prudence, and

that which makes it consist in benevolence, are the

principal accounts which have been given of the nature

of virtue. To one or other of them, all the

other descriptions of virtue, how different soever they

may appear, are easily reducible.

That system which places virtue in obedience to

the will of the Deity, may be counted either among

those which make it consist in prudence, or among

those which make it consist in propriety. When it is

asked, why we ought to obey the will of the Deity,

this question, which would be impious and absurd

in the highest degree, if asked from any doubt that

330we ought to obey him, can admit but of two different

answers. It must either be said that we ought to

obey the will of the Deity because he is a being of

infinite power, who will reward us eternally if we do

so, and punish us eternally if we do otherwise: Or

it must be said, that independent of any regard to our

own happiness, or to rewards and punishments of

any kind, there is a congruity and fitness that a creature

should obey its creator, that a limited and imperfect

being should submit to one of infinite and incomprehensible

perfections. Besides one or other of

these two it is impossible to conceive that any other

answer can be given to this question. If the first answer

be the proper one, virtue consists in prudence,

or in the proper pursuit of our own final interest and

happiness; since it is upon this account that we are

obliged to obey the will of the Deity. If the second

answer be the proper one, virtue must consist in propriety,

since the ground of our obligation to obedience

is the suitableness or congruity of the sentiments

of humility and submission to the superiority of the

object which excites them.

That system which places virtue in utility coincides

too with that which makes it consist in propriety.

According to this system all those qualities of the

mind which are agreeable or advantageous, either to

the person himself or to others, are approved of as

virtuous, and the contrary disapproved of as vicious.

But the agreeableness or utility of any affection depends

upon the degree which it is allowed to subsist

in. Every affection is useful when it is confined to

a certain degree of moderation, and every affection

is disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds.

According to this system therefore, virtue consists,

331not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of

all the affections, The only difference between it

and that which I have been endeavouring to establish,

is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the

correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural

and original measure of this proper degree.