The Theory of Moral Sentiments

f those systems which make virtue consist in prudence.

The most ancient of those systems which make

virtue consist in prudence, and of which any considerable

remains have come down to us, is that of

Epicurus, who is said, however, to have borrowed

all the leading principles of his philosophy, from

some of those who had gone before him, particularly

From Aristippus; though it is very probable, notwithstanding

this allegation of his enemies, that at

least his manner of applying those principles was altogether

his own.

According to Epicurus,[16] bodily pleasure and

pain were the sole ultimate objects of natural desire

and aversion. That they were always the natural

objects of those passions, he thought required no

312proof. Pleasure might, indeed, appear sometimes

to be avoided; not, however, because it was pleasure,

but because, by the enjoyment of it, we should

either forfeit some greater pleasure, or expose ourselves

to some pain that was more to be avoided than

this pleasure was to be desired. Pain, in the same

manner, might appear sometimes to be eligible; not,

however, because it was pain, but because by enduring

it we might either avoid a still greater pain,

or acquire some pleasure of much more importance.

That bodily pain and pleasure, therefore, were always

the natural objects of desire and aversion, was,

he thought, abundantly evident. Nor was it less so,

he imagined, that they were the sole ultimate objects

of those passions. Whatever else was either desired

or avoided was so, according to him, upon account

of its tendency to produce one or other of those sensations.

The tendency to procure pleasure rendered

power and riches desirable, as the contrary tendency

to produce pain made poverty and insignificancy the

objects of aversion. Honour and reputation were

valued, because the esteem and love of those we live

with were of the greatest consequence both to procure

pleasure and to defend us from pain. Ignominy

and bad fame, on the contrary, were to be avoided,

because the hatred, contempt, and resentment of

those we lived with destroyed all security, and necessarily

exposed us to the greatest bodily evils.

16. See Cicero de finibus, lib. i. Diogenes Laert. 1. x.

All the pleasures and pains of the mind were, according

to Epicurus, ultimately derived from those

of the body. The mind was happy when it thought

of the past pleasures of the body, and hoped for

others to come: and it was miserable when it thought

313of the pains which the body had formerly endured,

and dreaded the same or greater thereafter.

But the pleasures and pains of the mind, though

ultimately derived from those of the body, were

vastly greater than their originals. The body felt

only the sensation of the present instant, whereas the

mind felt also the past and the future, the one by

remembrance, the other by anticipation, and consequently

both suffered and enjoyed much more.

When we are under the greatest bodily pain, he observed,

we shall always find, if we attend to it, that

it is not the suffering of the present instant which

chiefly torments us, but either the agonizing remembrance

of the past, or the yet more horrible dread

of the future. The pain of each instant, considered

by itself, and cut off from all that goes before and all

that comes after it, is a trifle not worth the regarding.

Yet this is all which the body can ever be said

to suffer. In the same manner, when we enjoy the

greatest pleasure, we shall always find that the bodily

sensation, the sensation of the present instant makes

but a small part of our happiness, that our enjoyment

chiefly arises either from the chearful recollection

of the past, or the still more joyous anticipation

of the future, and that the mind always contributes

by much the largest share of the entertainment.

Since our happiness and misery, therefore, depended

chiefly on the mind, if this part of our nature

was well disposed, if our thoughts and opinions

were as they should be, it was of little importance

in what manner our body was affected. Though

under great bodily pain, we might still enjoy a considerable

share of happiness, if our reason and judgment

314maintained their superiority. We might entertain

ourselves with the remembrance of past, and

with the hopes of future pleasure; we might soften

the rigour of our pains, by recollecting what it was

which, even in this situation, we were under any necessity

of suffering. That this was merely the bodily

sensation, the pain of the present instant, which by

itself could never be very great. That whatever

agony we suffered from the dread of its continuance

was the effect of an opinion of the mind, which might

be corrected by juster sentiments; by considering

that, if our pains were violent, they would probably

be of short duration; and that if they were of

long continuance, they would probably be moderate,

and admit of many intervals of ease; and that, at

any rate, death was always at hand and within call

to deliver us, which as, according to him, it put an

end to all sensation, either of pain or pleasure, could

not be regarded as an evil. When we are, said he,

death is not; and when death is, we are not; death

therefore can be nothing to us.

If the actual sensation of positive pain was in itself

so little to be feared, that of pleasure was still

less to be desired. Naturally the sensation of pleasure

was much less pungent than that of pain. If,

therefore, this last could take so very little from the

happiness of a well-disposed mind, the other could

add scarce any thing to it. When the body was

free from pain and the mind from fear and anxiety,

the superadded sensation of bodily pleasure could be

of very little importance; and though it might diversify,

could not be properly be said to increase the

happiness of this situation.

315In ease of body, therefore, and in security or tranquillity

of mind, consisted, according to Epicurus,

the most perfect state of human nature, the most

complete happiness which man was capable of enjoying.

To obtain this great end of natural desire

was the sole object of all the virtues, which, according

to him, were not desirable upon their own account,

but upon account of their tendency to bring

about this situation.

Prudence, for example, though according to this

philosophy, the source and principle of all the virtues,

was not desirable upon its own account. That

careful and laborious and circumspect state of mind,

ever watchful and ever attentive to the most distant

consequences of every action, could not be a thing

pleasant or agreeable for its own sake, but upon account

of its tendency to procure the greatest goods

and to keep off the greatest evils.

To abstain from pleasure too, to curb and restrain

our natural passions for enjoyment, which was

the office of temperance, could never be desirable

for its own sake. The whole value of this virtue

arose from its utility, from its enabling us to postpone

the present enjoyment for the sake of a greater

to come, or to avoid a greater pain that might ensue

from it. Temperance, in short, was nothing but

prudence with regard to pleasure.

To support labour, to endure pain, to be exposed

to danger or to death, the situations which fortitude

would often lead us into, were surely still less the

objects of natural desire. They were chosen only to

avoid greater evils. We submitted to labour, in order

316to avoid the greater shame and pain of poverty,

and we exposed ourselves to danger and to death in

defence of our liberty and property, the means and

instruments of pleasure and happiness; or in defence

of our country, in the safety of which our own was

necessarily comprehended. Fortitude enabled us to

do all this chearfully, as the best which, in our present

situation, could possibly be done, and was in

reality no more than prudence, good judgment, and

presence of mind in properly appreciating pain, labour,

and danger, always choosing the less in order

to avoid the greater.

It is the same case with justice. To abstain from

what is anothers was not desirable on its own account,

and it could not surely be better for you, that I

should possess what is my own, than that you should

possess it. You ought however, to abstain from

whatever belongs to me, because by doing otherwise

you will provoke the resentment and indignation of

mankind. The security and tranquillity of your

mind will be entirely destroyed. You will be filled

with fear and consternation at the thought of that

punishment which you will imagine that men are at

all times ready to inflict upon you, and from which

no power, no art, no concealment, will ever, in your

own fancy, be sufficient to protect you. That other

species of justice which consists in doing proper good

offices to different persons, according to the various

relations of neighbours, kinsmen, friends, benefactors,

superiors, or equals, which they may stand in

to us, is recommended by the same reasons. To act

properly in all these different relations procures us

the esteem and love of those we live with; as to do

otherwise excites their contempt and hatred. By the

317one we naturally secure, by the other we necessarily

endanger our own ease and tranquillity, the great and

ultimate objects of all our desires. The whole virtue

of justice, therefore, the most important of all the

virtues, is no more than discreet and prudent conduct

with regard to our neighbours.

Such is the doctrine of Epicurus concerning the

nature of virtue. It may seem extraordinary that

this philosopher, who is described as a person of the

most amiable manners, should never have observed,

that, whatever may be the tendency of those virtues,

or of the contrary vices, with regard to our bodily

ease and security, the sentiments which they naturally

excite in others are the objects of a much more

passionate desire or aversion than all their other consequences;

That to be amiable, to be respectable,

to be the proper object of esteem, is by every well-disposed

mind more valued than all the ease and security

which love, respect, and esteem can procure us;

That, on the contrary, to be odious, to be contemptible,

to be the proper object of indignation, is more

dreadful than all that we can suffer in our body from

hatred, contempt, or indignation; and that consequently

our desire of the one character, and our aversion

to the other, cannot arise from any regard to the

effects which either of them is likely to produce upon

the body.

This system is, no doubt, altogether inconsistent

with that which I have been endeavouring to establish.

It is not difficult, however, to discover from

what phasis, if I may say so, from what particular

view or aspect of nature, this account of things derives

its probability. By the wise contrivance of the

318Author of nature, virtue is upon all ordinary occasions,

even with regard to this life, real wisdom, and

the surest and readiest means of obtaining both safety

and advantage. Our success or disappointment in

our undertakings must very much depend upon the

good or bad opinion which is commonly entertained

of us, and upon the general disposition of those we

live with, either to assist or to oppose us. But the

best, the surest, the easiest, and the readiest way of

obtaining the advantageous and of avoiding the unfavourable

judgments of others, is undoubtedly to

render ourselves the proper objects of the former and

not of the latter. “Do you desire, said Socrates,

the reputation of a good musician? The only sure

way of obtaining it, is to become a good musician.

Would you desire in the same manner to be thought

capable of serving your country either as a general

or as a statesman? The best way in this case too

is really to acquire the art and experience of war

and government, and to become really fit to be a

general or a statesman. And in the same manner

if you would be reckoned sober, temperate, just,

and equitable, the best way of acquiring this reputation

is to become sober, temperate, just, and

equitable. If you can really render yourself amiable,

respectable, and the proper object of esteem,

there is no fear of your not soon acquiring the love,

the respect, and esteem of those you live with.”

Since the practice of virtue, therefore, is in general

so advantageous, and that of vice so contrary to our

interest, the consideration of those opposite tendencies

undoubtedly stamps an additional beauty and

propriety upon the one, and a new deformity and

impropriety upon the other. Temperance, magnanimity,

justice, and beneficence, come thus to

319be approved of, not only under their proper characters,

but under the additional character of the highest

wisdom and most real prudence. And in the same

manner the contrary vices of intemperance, pusillanimity,

injustice, and either malevolence or sordid

selfishness, come to be disapproved of, not only under

their proper characters, but under the additional

character of the most short-sighted folly and weakness.

Epicurus appears in every virtue to have attended

to this species of propriety only. It is that

which is most apt to occur to those who are endeavouring

to persuade others to regularity of conduct.

When men by their practice, and perhaps too by

their maxims, manifestly show that the natural beauty

of virtue is not like to have much effect upon them,

how is it possible to move them but by representing

the folly of their conduct, and how much they themselves

are in the end likely to suffer by it?

By running up all the different virtues too to this

one species of propriety, Epicurus indulged a propensity,

which is natural to all men, but which philosophers

in particular are apt to cultivate with a peculiar

fondness, as the great means of displaying their

ingenuity, the propensity to account for all appearances

from as few principles as possible. And he,

no doubt, indulged this propensity still further, when

he referred all the primary objects of natural desire

and aversion to the pleasures and pains of the body.

The great patron of the atomical philosophy, who

took so much pleasure in deducing all the powers and

qualities of bodies from the most obvious and familiar,

the figure, motion, and arrangement of the

small parts of matter, felt no doubt a similar satisfaction,

when he accounted, in the same manner, for

320all the sentiments and passions of the mind from those

which are most obvious and familiar.

The system of Epicurus agreed with those of Plato,

Aristotle, and Zeno, in making virtue consist in

acting in the most suitable manner to obtain the

[17]primary objects of natural desire. It differed from

all of them in two other respects; first, in the account

which it gave of those primary objects of natural desire;

and secondly, in the account which it gave of

the excellence of virtue, or of the reason why that

quality ought to be esteemed.

17. Prima naturæ.

The primary objects of natural desire consisted,

according to Epicurus, in bodily pleasure and pain,

and in nothing else whereas, according to the other

three philosophers, there were many other objects,

such as knowledge, such as the happiness of our relations,

of our friends, of our country, which were

ultimately desirable for their own sakes.

Virtue too, according to Epicurus, did not deserve

to be pursued for its own sake, nor was itself one

of the ultimate objects of natural appetite, but was

eligible only upon account of its tendency to prevent

pain and to procure ease and pleasure. In the opinion

of the other three, on the contrary, it was desirable,

not merely as the means of procuring the other primary

objects of natural desire, but as something

which was in itself more valuable than them all.

Man, they thought, being born for action, his happiness

must consist, not merely in the agreeableness

of his passive sensations, but also in the propriety of

his active exertions.

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