An excerpt from the original text.(complete · 1118 words)
WHETHER THE GOVERNOR OF A PLACE BESIEGED OUGHT HIMSELF TO GO OUT TO PARLEY
Quintus Marcius, the Roman legate in the war against Perseus, King of
Macedon, to gain time wherein to reinforce his army, set on foot some
overtures of accommodation, with which the king being lulled asleep,
concluded a truce for some days, by this means giving his enemy
opportunity and leisure to recruit his forces, which was afterwards the
occasion of the king’s final ruin. Yet the elder senators, mindful of
their forefathers’ manners, condemned this proceeding as degenerating
from their ancient practice, which, they said, was to fight by valour,
and not by artifice, surprises, and night-encounters; neither by
pretended flight nor unexpected rallies to overcome their enemies; never
making war till having first proclaimed it, and very often assigned both
the hour and place of battle. Out of this generous principle it was that
they delivered up to Pyrrhus his treacherous physician, and to the
Etrurians their disloyal schoolmaster. This was, indeed, a procedure
truly Roman, and nothing allied to the Grecian subtlety, nor to the Punic
cunning, where it was reputed a victory of less glory to overcome by
force than by fraud. Deceit may serve for a need, but he only confesses
himself overcome who knows he is neither subdued by policy nor
misadventure, but by dint of valour, man to man, in a fair and just war.
It very well appears, by the discourse of these good old senators, that
this fine sentence was not yet received amongst them.
“Dolus, an virtus, quis in hoste requirat?”
[“What matters whether by valour or by strategem we overcome the
enemy?”--Aeneid, ii. 390]
The Achaians, says Polybius, abhorred all manner of double-dealing in
war, not reputing it a victory unless where the courage of the enemy was
fairly subdued:
“Eam vir sanctus et sapiens sciet veram esse victoriam, quae, salva fide
et integra dignitate, parabitur.”--[“An honest and prudent man will
acknowledge that only to be a true victory which shall be obtained saving
his own good faith and dignity.”--Florus, i. 12.]--Says another:
“Vosne velit, an me, regnare hera, quidve ferat,
fors virtute experiamur.”
[“Whether you or I shall rule, or what shall happen, let us
determine by valour.”--Cicero, De Offic., i. 12]
In the kingdom of Ternate, amongst those nations which we so broadly call
barbarians, they have a custom never to commence war, till it be first
proclaimed; adding withal an ample declaration of what means they have to
do it with, with what and how many men, what ammunitions, and what, both
offensive and defensive, arms; but also, that being done, if their
enemies do not yield and come to an agreement, they conceive it lawful to
employ without reproach in their wars any means which may help them to
conquer.
The ancient Florentines were so far from seeking to obtain any advantage
over their enemies by surprise, that they always gave them a month’s
warning before they drew their army into the field, by the continual
tolling of a bell they called Martinella.--[After St. Martin.]
For what concerns ourselves, who are not so scrupulous in this affair,
and who attribute the honour of the war to him who has the profit of it,
and who after Lysander say, “Where the lion’s skin is too short, we must
eke it out with a bit from that of a fox”; the most usual occasions of
surprise are derived from this practice, and we hold that there are no
moments wherein a chief ought to be more circumspect, and to have his eye
so much at watch, as those of parleys and treaties of accommodation; and
it is, therefore, become a general rule amongst the martial men of these
latter times, that a governor of a place never ought, in a time of siege,
to go out to parley. It was for this that in our fathers’ days the
Seigneurs de Montmord and de l’Assigni, defending Mousson against the
Count of Nassau, were so highly censured. But yet, as to this, it would
be excusable in that governor who, going out, should, notwithstanding,
do it in such manner that the safety and advantage should be on his side;
as Count Guido di Rangone did at Reggio (if we are to believe Du Bellay,
for Guicciardini says it was he himself) when the Seigneur de l’Escut
approached to parley, who stepped so little away from his fort, that a
disorder happening in the interim of parley, not only Monsieur de l’Escut
and his party who were advanced with him, found themselves by much the
weaker, insomuch that Alessandro Trivulcio was there slain, but he
himself follow the Count, and, relying upon his honour, to secure himself
from the danger of the shot within the walls of the town.
Eumenes, being shut up in the city of Nora by Antigonus, and by him
importuned to come out to speak with him, as he sent him word it was fit
he should to a greater man than himself, and one who had now an advantage
over him, returned this noble answer. “Tell him,” said he, “that I shall
never think any man greater than myself whilst I have my sword in my
hand,” and would not consent to come out to him till first, according to
his own demand, Antigonus had delivered him his own nephew Ptolomeus in
hostage.
And yet some have done very well in going out in person to parley, on the
word of the assailant: witness Henry de Vaux, a cavalier of Champagne,
who being besieged by the English in the Castle of Commercy, and
Bartholomew de Brunes, who commanded at the Leaguer, having so sapped the
greatest part of the castle without, that nothing remained but setting
fire to the props to bury the besieged under the ruins, he requested the
said Henry to come out to speak with him for his own good, which he did
with three more in company; and, his ruin being made apparent to him, he
conceived himself singularly obliged to his enemy, to whose discretion he
and his garrison surrendered themselves; and fire being presently applied
to the mine, the props no sooner began to fail, but the castle was
immediately blown up from its foundations, no one stone being left upon
another.
I could, and do, with great facility, rely upon the faith of another; but
I should very unwillingly do it in such a case, as it should thereby be
judged that it was rather an effect of my despair and want of courage
than voluntarily and out of confidence and security in the faith of him
with whom I had to do.
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Let's Analyse the Pattern
When someone asks you to abandon your position of strength 'for fairness,' they may be exploiting your desire to appear reasonable to gain strategic advantage.
Why This Matters
Connect literature to life
This chapter teaches how to recognize when someone's reasonable request is actually designed to remove your advantages or protections.
Practice This Today
This week, notice when someone asks you to bypass normal procedures 'just this once' or meet without your usual support systems present—then ask yourself what they gain and what you lose.
Now let's explore the literary elements.
Key Quotes & Analysis
"It was reputed a victory of less glory to overcome by force than by fraud"
Context: Montaigne contrasts Roman values with Greek and Carthaginian approaches to warfare
This reveals the cultural clash between honor-based and results-based thinking. Some societies valued how you won more than whether you won, while others prioritized victory by any means necessary.
In Today's Words:
Some people think it's more impressive to win by being clever than by being stronger.
"He only confesses himself overcome who knows he is neither subdued by policy nor misadventure, but by dint of valour, man to man, in a fair and just war"
Context: Explaining the Roman view of honorable defeat versus shameful loss
This shows how Romans distinguished between different types of defeat. Being outfought was acceptable; being outsmarted or unlucky was humiliating. It reveals their obsession with personal honor over practical outcomes.
In Today's Words:
You can only truly admit you lost if the other person beat you fair and square, not through tricks or bad luck.
"This was, indeed, a procedure truly Roman, and nothing allied to the Grecian subtlety, nor to the Punic cunning"
Context: Describing the Roman practice of returning enemy spies and traitors
Montaigne uses this to highlight how different cultures approach conflict. Romans valued straightforward honor, while Greeks and Carthaginians embraced strategic deception. Each approach had costs and benefits.
In Today's Words:
This was classic Roman behavior - totally different from how Greeks played mind games or how Carthaginians used dirty tricks.
Thematic Threads
Trust
In This Chapter
Montaigne shows how trust becomes weaponized when someone asks you to prove your good faith by giving up your advantages
Development
Introduced here
In Your Life:
You might see this when someone asks you to 'trust them' by removing the very protections that would ensure that trust is warranted
Honor
In This Chapter
Ancient Romans valued honor so highly they'd return enemy spies, but Montaigne questions whether rigid honor codes become strategic weaknesses
Development
Introduced here
In Your Life:
You might struggle with this when being 'the bigger person' actually enables someone to take advantage of you
Power
In This Chapter
The chapter explores how power dynamics shift when commanders leave their fortresses—and how this applies to any negotiation
Development
Introduced here
In Your Life:
You might experience this when someone asks you to meet on 'neutral ground' that's actually more favorable to them
Deception
In This Chapter
Montaigne contrasts obvious lies with sophisticated manipulation that exploits our virtues against us
Development
Introduced here
In Your Life:
You might encounter this when someone frames their request as being about your character rather than their advantage
Strategy
In This Chapter
The essay teaches strategic thinking—how to maintain integrity while recognizing when others are playing a different game
Development
Introduced here
In Your Life:
You might need this when balancing being a good person with protecting your legitimate interests
You now have the context. Time to form your own thoughts.
Discussion Questions
- 1
What happened to the Roman commanders who left their fortresses to negotiate, and why did they make that choice?
analysis • surface - 2
Why does Montaigne suggest that the Romans' rigid honor code sometimes worked against them, even though it was admirable?
analysis • medium - 3
Can you think of a time when someone asked you to 'step away' from your position of strength for a conversation - at work, in family situations, or in negotiations?
application • medium - 4
How would you tell the difference between someone genuinely wanting to negotiate fairly versus someone trying to manipulate you into giving up your advantages?
application • deep - 5
What does this chapter reveal about the tension between being trustworthy and being strategic - can you be both without compromising your integrity?
reflection • deep
Critical Thinking Exercise
Map Your Personal Fortress
Think of a current situation where you hold some leverage - maybe a job negotiation, family decision, or personal boundary. Write down what your 'fortress' is (your sources of strength and protection), then imagine someone asking you to step away from those advantages 'for fairness.' What would they gain? What would you lose?
Consider:
- •Your fortress might be documentation, witnesses, legal protections, or simply time to think
- •Notice how reasonable requests can mask strategic moves
- •Consider whether the conversation truly requires you to abandon your position
Journaling Prompt
Write about a time when you gave up a position of strength to seem reasonable or fair. What happened? What would you do differently now, knowing what you know?
Coming Up Next...
Chapter 6: When Negotiations Turn Deadly
Having explored when to trust enemies during negotiations, Montaigne next examines the most dangerous moment of all—the actual hour when talks begin. What makes these moments so perilous, and how do smart leaders protect themselves when words become weapons?




