Summary
Tolstoy pulls back the curtain on one of history's most famous battles—Borodino—and reveals how the official story is completely wrong. Both Napoleon and Kutuzov made what appears to be a mathematically stupid decision: fighting a battle that would devastate both armies and solve nothing. Napoleon knew he was overextended and couldn't afford to lose a quarter of his men. Kutuzov knew that losing this battle meant losing Moscow. Yet both commanders went ahead anyway, acting against all logic and self-interest. Tolstoy argues they weren't brilliant strategists following some master plan—they were trapped by circumstances, making desperate choices in the moment. The real kicker? Historians later invented elaborate explanations to make these panicked decisions look like genius moves. The battle itself was a disaster of poor planning and miscommunication. The Russians ended up fighting on terrible ground they never chose, with half the forces they needed, because a series of small mistakes snowballed into catastrophe. Tolstoy uses this military example to show how life really works: most big events aren't the result of careful planning by brilliant leaders, but rather the chaotic collision of circumstances, fear, pride, and human error. The neat stories we tell afterward are just that—stories designed to make sense of senseless events.
Coming Up in Chapter 210
Having exposed the myth of strategic genius at Borodino, Tolstoy will dive deeper into what actually drives human behavior during crisis moments—and why we're so desperate to believe in the myth of control.
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An excerpt from the original text.(~500 words)
n the twenty-fourth of August the battle of the Shevárdino Redoubt was fought, on the twenty-fifth not a shot was fired by either side, and on the twenty-sixth the battle of Borodinó itself took place. Why and how were the battles of Shevárdino and Borodinó given and accepted? Why was the battle of Borodinó fought? There was not the least sense in it for either the French or the Russians. Its immediate result for the Russians was, and was bound to be, that we were brought nearer to the destruction of Moscow—which we feared more than anything in the world; and for the French its immediate result was that they were brought nearer to the destruction of their whole army—which they feared more than anything in the world. What the result must be was quite obvious, and yet Napoleon offered and Kutúzov accepted that battle. If the commanders had been guided by reason, it would seem that it must have been obvious to Napoleon that by advancing thirteen hundred miles and giving battle with a probability of losing a quarter of his army, he was advancing to certain destruction, and it must have been equally clear to Kutúzov that by accepting battle and risking the loss of a quarter of his army he would certainly lose Moscow. For Kutúzov this was mathematically clear, as it is that if when playing draughts I have one man less and go on exchanging, I shall certainly lose, and therefore should not exchange. When my opponent has sixteen men and I have fourteen, I am only one eighth weaker than he, but when I have exchanged thirteen more men he will be three times as strong as I am. Before the battle of Borodinó our strength in proportion to the French was about as five to six, but after that battle it was little more than one to two: previously we had a hundred thousand against a hundred and twenty thousand; afterwards little more than fifty thousand against a hundred thousand. Yet the shrewd and experienced Kutúzov accepted the battle, while Napoleon, who was said to be a commander of genius, gave it, losing a quarter of his army and lengthening his lines of communication still more. If it is said that he expected to end the campaign by occupying Moscow as he had ended a previous campaign by occupying Vienna, there is much evidence to the contrary. Napoleon’s historians themselves tell us that from Smolénsk onwards he wished to stop, knew the danger of his extended position, and knew that the occupation of Moscow would not be the end of the campaign, for he had seen at Smolénsk the state in which Russian towns were left to him, and had not received a single reply to his repeated announcements of his wish to negotiate. In giving and accepting battle at Borodinó, Kutúzov acted involuntarily and irrationally. But later on, to fit what had occurred, the historians provided cunningly devised evidence of the foresight...
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Intelligence Amplifier™ Analysis
The Hindsight Hero Trap
The tendency to create false strategic narratives after making desperate or chaotic decisions, transforming panic into apparent genius through retroactive storytelling.
Why This Matters
Connect literature to life
This chapter teaches you to spot when people create false explanations for desperate decisions after the fact.
Practice This Today
This week, notice when someone at work presents a hasty choice as a strategic decision—look for signs they're explaining away panic or mistakes.
Now let's explore the literary elements.
Terms to Know
Strategic blunder
When leaders make decisions that go against obvious logic and their own best interests. In this chapter, both Napoleon and Kutuzov choose to fight a battle they know will devastate their armies and accomplish nothing useful.
Modern Usage:
Like when companies launch products they know will fail, or when politicians take positions that hurt their own careers - sometimes people get trapped by circumstances and make terrible choices.
Historical revisionism
The way people rewrite history after the fact to make random, chaotic events look like they were part of some brilliant master plan. Tolstoy argues that historians do this constantly with military battles.
Modern Usage:
Social media does this constantly - people post about their 'journey' and '5-year plan' when really they just stumbled into success or got lucky.
Redoubt
A small, temporary fort or defensive position built quickly during wartime. The Shevardino Redoubt was one of these mini-fortresses that became the site of preliminary fighting before the main battle.
Modern Usage:
Like when you barricade yourself in your room during family drama, or when departments at work create their own little defensive territories.
Mathematical certainty
When the outcome of a situation is so obvious that you can predict it like a math problem. Tolstoy compares the battle to a game of checkers where you're already losing pieces.
Modern Usage:
When you know for sure that staying in a toxic relationship will end badly, or that maxing out credit cards will lead to financial disaster.
Circumstantial trap
When events and pressures build up around you until you feel like you have no choice but to make a bad decision. Both commanders felt trapped into fighting this battle.
Modern Usage:
Like when you're so deep in debt that you take a payday loan, knowing it'll make things worse - sometimes circumstances box you in.
Command delusion
The false belief that leaders are always in control and making calculated decisions. Tolstoy shows how commanders often just react to chaos and hope for the best.
Modern Usage:
The myth that CEOs and politicians always know what they're doing - most of the time they're just winging it and hoping things work out.
Characters in This Chapter
Napoleon
Antagonist commander
Makes the decision to fight at Borodino despite knowing it could destroy his army. Tolstoy shows him as trapped by his own momentum and unable to back down, not as the military genius of legend.
Modern Equivalent:
The CEO who doubles down on a failing strategy because admitting mistake would look weak
Kutuzov
Russian commander
Accepts the battle at Borodino even though he knows it means losing Moscow. Portrayed as equally trapped by circumstances and political pressure, forced into a fight he doesn't want.
Modern Equivalent:
The manager who has to implement a policy they know is stupid because it came from higher up
Key Quotes & Analysis
"If the commanders had been guided by reason, it would seem that it must have been obvious to Napoleon that by advancing thirteen hundred miles and giving battle with a probability of losing a quarter of his army, he was advancing to certain destruction"
Context: Tolstoy analyzing why the battle made no logical sense for either side
This quote demolishes the myth of Napoleon as a strategic mastermind. Tolstoy shows that any reasonable person could see this was a terrible idea, yet Napoleon did it anyway because he was trapped by circumstances.
In Today's Words:
Anyone with half a brain could see this was going to be a disaster, but he did it anyway
"For Kutuzov this was mathematically clear, as it is that if when playing draughts I have one man less and go on exchanging, I shall certainly lose"
Context: Explaining how obvious it was that accepting this battle would lead to losing Moscow
Tolstoy uses a simple game analogy to show how clear the outcome should have been. This makes the decision to fight seem even more irrational and desperate.
In Today's Words:
It was as obvious as knowing you'll lose at checkers if you keep trading pieces when you're already behind
"Why and how were the battles of Shevárdino and Borodinó given and accepted? Why was the battle of Borodinó fought? There was not the least sense in it for either the French or the Russians."
Context: Opening the chapter by questioning the official historical narrative
Tolstoy immediately challenges everything we think we know about this famous battle. He's saying the whole thing was pointless and irrational, setting up his argument against hero worship in history.
In Today's Words:
Why did this battle even happen? It made absolutely no sense for anyone involved
Thematic Threads
Pride
In This Chapter
Both Napoleon and Kutuzov's pride prevents them from admitting they're trapped in an impossible situation, forcing them into a destructive battle neither wants
Development
Evolved from individual character pride to institutional pride that shapes historical narratives
In Your Life:
You might find yourself doubling down on bad decisions at work rather than admitting you made a mistake
Power
In This Chapter
The commanders' positions of power trap them into making choices that serve their image rather than their actual interests
Development
Shows how power creates its own constraints, limiting rather than expanding real options
In Your Life:
You might make choices to maintain your reputation as the 'reliable one' even when it's destroying you
Truth
In This Chapter
Historians later invent elaborate explanations to make senseless decisions appear logical and strategic
Development
Reveals how official narratives often obscure rather than illuminate reality
In Your Life:
You might find yourself creating stories about why you stayed in bad relationships or jobs longer than you should have
Control
In This Chapter
Both leaders discover they have far less control over events than they believed, yet must act as if they're in command
Development
Exposes the illusion of control that powerful people must maintain
In Your Life:
You might realize you're making decisions based on what you think you should control rather than what you actually can influence
You now have the context. Time to form your own thoughts.
Discussion Questions
- 1
According to Tolstoy, why did both Napoleon and Kutuzov agree to fight at Borodino even though they knew it would devastate their armies and solve nothing?
analysis • surface - 2
How does Tolstoy explain the difference between what actually happened during the battle versus the stories historians told about it afterward?
analysis • medium - 3
Think about a time when someone at your workplace made a bad decision under pressure, then later presented it as a smart strategic move. What did that look like?
application • medium - 4
When you're stuck between bad choices and have to pick one quickly, how can you avoid fooling yourself into thinking your desperate choice was actually brilliant?
application • deep - 5
What does this chapter suggest about how much control powerful people actually have over major events, and why might this be both scary and liberating to understand?
reflection • deep
Critical Thinking Exercise
Spot the Retrofit
Think of a recent decision you made that didn't turn out well - maybe taking a job, ending a relationship, or making a purchase. Write down the real reasons you made that choice in the moment (pressure, fear, limited options, emotions). Then write down how you explained it to others afterward. Notice the difference between your actual messy reasoning and your cleaned-up public story.
Consider:
- •Look for places where you added logic that wasn't really there at the time
- •Notice if you emphasized smart-sounding reasons while downplaying emotional or desperate ones
- •Consider whether your retrofitted story might be preventing you from learning from what actually happened
Journaling Prompt
Write about a major decision in your life that everyone praised as brilliant, but you know was really just you making the best of a bad situation. What would change if you told that story honestly?
Coming Up Next...
Chapter 210: The Weight of Twenty Thousand
Having exposed the myth of strategic genius at Borodino, Tolstoy will dive deeper into what actually drives human behavior during crisis moments—and why we're so desperate to believe in the myth of control.
