The Theory of Moral Sentiments

f the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance with our own.

When the original passions of the person

principally concerned are in perfect concord

with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator,

they necessarily appear to this last just and

proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the

contrary, when, upon bringing the case home to

himself, he finds that they do not coincide with

what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust

and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which

excite them. To approve of the passions of another,

therefore, as suitable to their objects, is the

same thing as to observe that we entirely sympathize

with them; and not to approve of them as such,

is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely

sympathize with them. The man who resents

the injuries that have been done to me, and

15observes that I resent them precisely as he does, necessarily

approves of my resentment. The man

whose sympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot

but admit the reasonableness of my sorrow. He

who admires the same poem, or the same picture,

and admires them exactly as I do, must surely allow

the justness of my admiration. He who laughs at

the same joke, and laughs along with me, cannot

well deny the propriety of my laughter. On the

contrary, the person who, upon these different occasions,

either feels no such emotion as that which

I feel, or feels none that bears any proportion to

mine, cannot avoid disapproving my sentiments on

account of their dissonance with his own. If my

animosity goes beyond what the indignation of my

friend can correspond to; if my grief exceeds what

his most tender compassion can go along with; if

my admiration is either too high or too low to tally

with his own; if I laugh loud and heartily when he

only smiles, or, on the contrary, only smile when he

laughs loud and heartily; in all these cases, as soon

as he comes from considering the object, to observe

how I am affected by it, according as there is more

or less disproportion between his sentiments and

mine, I must incur a greater or less degree of his

disapprobation: and upon all occasions his own

sentiments are the standards and measures by which

he judges of mine.

To approve of another man’s opinions is to adopt

those opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of

them. If the same arguments which convince you

convince me likewise, I necessarily approve of your

conviction; and if they do not, I necessarily disapprove

of it: neither can I possibly conceive that I

16should do the one without the other. To approve

or disapprove, therefore, of the opinions of others

is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more

than to observe their agreement or disagreement

with our own. But this is equally the case with

regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the

sentiments or passions of others.

There are, indeed, some cases in which we seem

to approve without any sympathy or correspondence

of sentiments, and in which, consequently, the sentiment

of approbation would seem to be different

from the perception of this coincidence. A little

attention, however, will convince us that even in

these cases our approbation is ultimately founded

upon a sympathy or correspondence of this kind.

I shall give an instance in things of a very frivolous

nature, because in them the judgments of mankind

are less apt to be perverted by wrong systems. We

may often approve of a jest, and think the laughter

of the company quite just and proper, though we

ourselves do not laugh, because, perhaps, we are in

a grave humour, or happen to have our attention

engaged with other objects. We have learned,

however, from experience, what sort of pleasantry

as upon most occasions capable of making us laugh,

and we observe that this is one of that kind. We

approve, therefore, of the laughter of the company,

and feel that it is natural and suitable to its object;

because, though in our present mood we cannot easily

enter into it, we are sensible that upon most occasions

we should very heartily join in it.

The same thing often happens with regard to all

the other passions. A stranger passes by us in the

17street with all the marks of the deepest affliction;

and we are immediately told that he has just received

the news of the death of his father. It is impossible

that, in this case, we should not approve of

his grief. Yet it may often happen, without any

defect of humanity on our part, that, so far from

entering into the violence of his sorrow, we should

scarce conceive the first movements of concern upon

his account. Both he and his father, perhaps, are

intirely unknown to us, or we happen to be employed

about other things, and do not take time to picture

out in our imagination the different circumstances of

distress which must occur to him. We have learned,

however, from experience, that such a misfortune

naturally excites such a degree of sorrow, and

we know that if we took time to consider his situation,

fully and in all its parts, we should, without

doubt, most sincerely sympathize with him. It is

upon the consciousness of this conditional sympathy,

that our approbation of his sorrow is founded, even

in those cases in which that sympathy does not actually

take place; and the general rules derived

from our preceding experience of what our sentiments

would commonly correspond with, correct

upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety

of our present emotions.

The sentiment or affection of the heart from

which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole

virtue or vice must ultimately depend, may be considered

under two different aspects, or in two different

relations; first, in relation to the cause which

excites it, or the motive which gives occasion to it;

and secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes,

or the effect which it tends to produce.

18In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion

or disproportion which the affection seems

to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists

the propriety or impropriety, the decency or

ungracefulness of the consequent action.

In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects

which the affection aims at, or tends to produce,

consists the merit or demerit of the action, the qualities

by which it is entitled to reward, or is deserving

of punishment.

Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly

the tendency of affections, and have given little

attention to the relation which they stand in to the

cause which excites them. In common life, however,

when we judge of any person’s conduct, and of the

sentiments which directed it, we constantly consider

them under both these aspects. When we blame in

another man the excesses of love, of grief, of resentment,

we not only consider the ruinous effects

which they tend to produce, but the little occasion

which was given for them. The merit of his favourite,

we say, is not so great, his misfortune is not so

dreadful, his provocation is not so extraordinary, as

to justify so violent a passion. We should have indulged,

we say; perhaps, have approved of the violence

of his emotion, had the cause been in any respect

proportioned to it.

When we judge in this manner of any affection,

as proportioned or disproportioned to the cause which

excites it, it is scarce possible that we should make

use of any other rule or canon but the correspondent

affection in ourselves. If, upon bringing the case

19home to our own breast, we find that the sentiments

which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with

our own, we necessarily approve of them as proportioned

and suitable to their objects; if otherwise,

we necessarily disapprove of them, as extravagant

and out of proportion.

Every faculty in one man is the measure by which

he judges of the like faculty in another. I judge of

your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of

your reason by my reason, of your resentment by

my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither

have nor can have any other way of judging about

them.