The Theory of Moral Sentiments

f the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments.

Such is the effect of the good or bad consequence

of actions upon the sentiments both of

the person who performs them, and of others; and

thus, Fortune, which governs the world, has some

influence where we should be least willing to allow

her any, and directs in some measure the sentiments

of mankind, with regard to the character and conduct

both of themselves and others. That the world

judges by the event, and not by the design, has been

in all ages the complaint, and is the great discouragement

of virtue. Every body agrees to the general

maxim, that as the event does not depend on the

agent, it ought to have no influence upon your sentiments,

with regard to the merit or propriety of his

conduct. But when we come to particulars, we

find that our sentiments are scarce in any one instance

exactly conformable to what this equitable

maxim would direct. The happy or unprosperous

event of any action, is not only apt to give us a good

or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was

conducted, but almost always too animates our gratitude

or resentment, our sense of the merit or demerit

of the design.

168Nature, however, when the implanted the seeds

of this irregularity in the human breast, seems, as

upon all other occasions, to have intended the happiness

and perfection of the species. If the hurtfulness

of the design, if the malevolence of the affection,

were alone the causes which excited our resentment,

we should feel all the furies of that passion against any

person in whose breast we suspected or believed such

designs or affections were harboured, though they

had never broke out into any actions. Sentiments,

thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of

punishment; and if the indignation of mankind ran

as high against them as against actions; if the baseness

of the thought which had given birth to no action,

seemed in the eyes of the world as much to call

aloud for vengeance as the baseness of the action,

every court of judicature would become a real inquisition.

There would be no safety for the most innocent

and circumspect conduct. Bad wishes, bad

views, bad designs, might still be suspected; and while

these excited the same indignation with bad conduct,

while bad intentions were as much resented as bad

actions, they would equally expose the person to punishment

and resentment. Actions therefore which

either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it,

and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it, are by

the Author of nature rendered the only proper and

approved objects of human punishment and resentment.

Sentiments, designs, affections, though it is

from these that according to cool reason human

actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are

placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits

of every human jurisdiction, and are reserved

for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal.

169That necessary rule of justice, therefore, that men

in this life are liable to punishment for their actions

only, not for their designs and intentions, is founded

upon this salutary and useful irregularity in human

sentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at

first sight appears so absurd and unaccountable.

But every part of nature, when attentively surveyed,

equally demonstrates the providential care of its

Author, and we may admire the wisdom and goodness

of God even in the weakness and folly of

men.

Nor is that irregularity of sentiments altogether

without its utility, by which the merit of an unsuccessful

attempt to serve, and much more that of mere

good inclinations and kind wishes, appears to be imperfect.

Man was made for action, and to promote

by the exertion of his faculties such changes in

the external circumstances both of himself and

others, as may seem most favourable to the happiness

of all. He must not be satisfied with indolent

benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind,

because in his heart he wishes well to the prosperity

of the world. That he may call forth the

whole vigour of his soul, and strain every nerve, in

order to produce those ends which it is the purpose of

his being to advance, Nature has taught him, that

neither himself nor mankind can be fully satisfied

with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure

of applause, unless he has actually produced them.

He is made to know, that the praise of good intentions,

without the merit of good offices, will be but of

little avail to excite either the loudest acclamations

of the world, or even the highest degree of self-applause.

The man who has performed no single

action of importance, but whose whole conversation

170and deportment express the justest, the noblest, and

most generous sentiments, can be entitled to demand

no very high reward, even though his inutility should

be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity

to serve. We can still refuse it him without blame.

We can still ask him, what have you done? What

actual service can you produce, to entitle you to so

great a recompense? We esteem you, and love you;

but we owe you nothing. To reward indeed that

latent virtue which has been useless only for want of

an opportunity to serve, to bestow upon it those

honours and preferments, which, though in some

measure it may be said to deserve them, it could not

with propriety have insisted upon, is the effect of the

most divine benevolence. To punish, on the contrary,

for the affections of the heart only, where no

crime has been committed, is the most insolent and

barbarous tyranny. The benevolent affections seem

to deserve most praise, when they do not wait till it

becomes almost a crime for them not to exert themselves.

The malevolent, on the contrary, can scarce

be too tardy, too slow, or deliberate.

It is even of use that the evil which is done without

design should be regarded as a misfortune to the doer

as well as to the sufferer. Man is thereby taught to

reverence the happiness of his brethren, to tremble

lest he should, even unknowingly, do any thing that

can hurt them, and to dread that animal resentment

which he feels is ready to burst out against him, if

he should without design be the unhappy instrument

of their calamity.

Notwithstanding, however, all these seeming irregularities

of sentiment, if man should unfortunately

171either give occasion to those evils which he did not

intend, or fail in producing that good which he intended,

nature has not left his innocence altogether

without consolation, nor his virtue altogether without

reward. He then calls to his assistance that just

and equitable maxim, that those events which did

not depend upon our conduct ought not to diminish

the esteem that is due to us. He summons up his

whole magnanimity and firmness of soul, and strives

to regard himself, not in the light in which he at

present appears, but in that in which he ought

to appear, in which he would have appeared

had his generous designs been crowned with success,

and in which he would still appear, notwithstanding

their miscarriage, if the sentiments of mankind

were either altogether candid and equitable, or

even perfectly consistent with themselves. The

more candid and humane part of mankind entirely go

along with the efforts which he thus makes to support

himself in his own opinion. They exert their

whole generosity and greatness of mind, to correct

in themselves this irregularity of human nature, and

endeavour to regard his unfortunate magnanimity in

the same light in which, had it been successful, they

would, without any such generous exertion, have naturally

been disposed to consider it.

173

PART III.

Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.

CONSISTING OF ONE SECTION.